If you pay attention to the proposed reform of the GIS bodies, then, in fact, virtually nothing changes
After the collapse of the USSR, the former republics inherited a Soviet-style system of judicial decisions.
Ukraine was no exception, in which the judicial system was involved in the institution of compulsory enforcement of court decisions in 1999. Bailiffs worked in the courts and were assigned to the judge who made the decision.
In 1998, the Law of Ukraine “On State Executive Service” was adopted. A year later, the State Executive Service (GIS) was formed as part of the Ministry of Justice, which was entrusted with the enforcement of decisions of courts and extrajudicial bodies.
All this time, the state was not worried much about improving procedural legislation governing the execution of court decisions, but it went around in circles, carrying out ridiculous reforms of enforcement bodies.
So, by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On the Formation of a Government Government Body within the Ministry of Justice” dated April 23, 2005 No. 320, as part of the Ministry of Justice, the Department of State Executive Service was established as a government body of government on the basis of state executive service bodies.
In this status, the GIS Department did not last long, because on the basis of the Law of Ukraine “On Amending the Laws of Ukraine“ On the State Executive Service ”and“ On Enforcement Proceedings ”regarding the reform of state executive bodies”, adopted in late 2006, already in 2007 .. he again became a department within the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.
Subsequently, by Decree of the President of Ukraine dated 06.04.2011 No. 385/2011 “On the Approval of the Regulation on the State Executive Service of Ukraine”, the latter was granted the status of a central executive body, the activities of which are directed and coordinated by the CMU through the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.
It is indicative enough that the Regulation on the State Executive Service of Ukraine, approved by a presidential decree, completely contradicted the Law of Ukraine “On State Executive Service” regarding the determination of the GIS status and the system of bodies that belong to its composition, but this did not interfere with its activities until the recent decisions on the elimination of ICE as a central authority.
Of course, the State Executive Service, in its perception as a body entrusted with the execution of decisions of courts and other bodies, does not cease to exist, but only takes its place determined by law as the Department of State Executive Service of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.
What do we have in the dry residue? The enforcement agency has been depleted by pseudo-reforms, the “calling card” of which is extremely low material and technical support, heavy workload, corruption, and almost zero motivation of its employees to fulfill their duties.
The state is not able to help this today – military operations in the east form a budget for economy, not development.
Will the percentage of executed court decisions increase as a result of the liquidation of ICE as a government body? Of course not.
If we turn to the European experience, we can say that in many European countries enforcement of judicial decisions is entrusted to private individuals.
Private bailiffs also at one time completely replaced bailiffs in the Baltic countries – Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia.
In addition, there are a number of countries where there is a mixed system of enforcement, where private actors operate along with state actors.
Also, a mixed system of enforcement of judgments was introduced several years ago in post-Soviet countries – Georgia and Kazakhstan.
The first results of the work of private performers in these countries showed that they work much more efficiently than their “state” colleagues.
None of the post-Soviet states, has introduced a “private” system for the enforcement of judicial decisions – full or mixed, has not returned to the old system.
Given the experience of such reforms in European and post-Soviet countries, one can predict the following positive consequences of introducing the institution of private performers in Ukraine:
Reducing the burden on government performers, and competition between private performers for the exacting client, which will increase the overall performance.
Reducing the time for enforcement proceedings and increasing indicators of real execution through the material interest of a private performer in the implementation of all executive actions.
The eradication of the traditional corruption component in the enforcement system. A private contractor will not be interested in underestimating the cost of selling the seized property, since the amount of his remuneration will depend on the amount of actually recovered funds.
Saving budget funds, reducing the staff of public servants.